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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Jesse Stephen Barber appeals from the judgment of conviction for domestic
battery, elevated to a felony based on a finding that he had two prior convictions within
the preceding fifteen years. On appeal, he asserts that the evidence was insufficient to
support the district court's finding on the sentencing enhancement. In the alternative,
he asserts that the district court deprived him of his constitutional right to a jury trial on
the sentencing enhancement when it found the sentencing enhancement in the absence
of a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to a jury trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Jesse Stephen Barber was charged by Information with felony domestic battery
(traumatic injury), and in the alternative, misdemeanor domestic battery; with respect to
the misdemeanor domestic battery charge, the State filed a felony enhancement
alleging two prior convictions for the same offense within the preceding fifteen years.
(R., pp.23-24.) The matter proceeded to a jury trial, halfway through which Mr. Barber

moved to act as his own attorney, and after a colloquy involving the requisite Faretta 1
warnings, his motion was granted. With his consent, Mr. Barber's attorney was named
standby counsel. (Tr., p.205, L.3 - p.213, L.22.) The jury acquitted Mr. Barber of felony
domestic battery (traumatic injury), and found him guilty of the lesser-included charge of
misdemeanor domestic battery. (Tr., p.380, L.9 - p.381, L.7.)

1

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).

1

At what was apparently a court triai2 on the sentencing enhancement, the district
court determined that the misdemeanor domestic battery charge amounted to a felony.
(Tr., p.381, L.20 - p.384, L.6.)

At sentencing, the district court imposed a unified

sentence of five years, with two years fixed. 3

(Supp.Tr., p.10, L.23 - p.11, L.1.)

Mr. Barber filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., p.85.)

Mr. Barber describes it as "apparently a court trial" because he was never asked
whether he waived his right to a jury trial on the enhancement. For more on this issue,
see the argument set forth in Part 11, infra.
3 Mr. Barber filed a timely Rule 35 motion, seeking a reduction of his sentence.
(R., pp.71-74.) The district court granted relief, over the State's objection, by retaining
jurisdiction over Mr. Barber's case for one year. (R., pp.91-95.)
2
2

ISSUES
1.

Was the evidence sufficient to establish the facts necessary to find the felony
enhancement, namely that Mr. Barber had two separate and distinct prior
convictions for domestic battery?

2.

Was Mr. Barber deprived of his constitutional right to a jury trial when the district
court found the sentencing enhancement in the absence of a knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary waiver of his right to a jury trial on the issue?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
The Evidence Was Insufficient To Establish The Facts Necessary To Find The Felony
Enhancement, Namely That Mr. Barber Had Two Separate And Distinct Prior
Convictions For Domestic Battery
Mr. Barber asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence from which
the district court could have concluded that he had been previously convicted of the two
separate and distinct domestic batteries necessary to elevate the domestic battery
conviction in this case to a felony under Idaho Code § 18-918(3)(c).

As such, the

judgment of conviction must be vacated, with this matter remanded for resentencing on
a conviction for misdemeanor domestic battery.
Idaho Code § 18-918(3)(c) contains a provision that elevates a misdemeanor
domestic battery to a felony, in relevant part, as follows:
Any person who pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a violation of this
subsection (3) [misdemeanor domestic assault or battery] who previously
has pied guilty to or been found guilty of two (2) violations of this
subsection (3), or of any substantially conforming foreign criminal violation
or any combination thereof, notwithstanding the form of the judgment or
withheld judgment, within fifteen (15) years of the first conviction, shall be
guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison for a term not to exceed five (5) years or by a fine not to exceed five
thousand dollars ($5,000) or by both fine and imprisonment
I.C. § 18-918(3)(c).
No Idaho appellate court has yet considered whether two prior convictions
entered on the same date constitute separate and distinct convictions for purposes of
the felony enhancement provided for in Idaho Code § 18-918(3)(c).

4

As such, it is

necessary to examine Idaho appellate court decisions interpreting the general persistent
violator enhancement statute, Idaho Code§ 19-2514. 4
In considering Idaho's persistent violator statute, the Idaho Court of Appeals has
noted, "The majority of jurisdictions do not permit multiple convictions entered the same
day or charged in the same information to be used to establish a defendant's status as
a habitual offender" based on the logic that "a defendant should be entitled to an
opportunity to reform himself between convictions or that the persistent violator statute
seeks to warn first time offenders." State v. Brandt, 110 Idaho 341, 344 (Ct. App. 1986)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). In its first chance to interpret Idaho's persistent
violator statute, the Court of Appeals adopted this majority rule, explaining, "Generally,
we agree with the majority that convictions entered the same day or charged in the
same information should count as a single conviction for purposes of establishing
habitual offender status." Id. (emphasis added). It did incorporate an exception to the
general rule, explaining, "[T]he nature of the convictions in any given situation must be
examined to make certain that the general rule is appropriate." Id.
Applying both the general rule and the exception to the facts of Brandt's case,
the court explained that his prior convictions fell under the exception for the following
reasons:
The three offenses here were charged in three separate informations and
each charge represented a separate crime occurring in a separate
location with a separate victim. One of the crimes took place in February,
1984, and the other two crimes in January, 1984. The judgments and
sentences were imposed the same day because of a plea bargain
Idaho Code § 19-2514 provides: "Any person convicted for the third time of the
commission of a felony, whether the previous convictions were had within the state of
Idaho or were had outside the state of Idaho, shall be considered a persistent violator of
the law, and on such third conviction shall be sentenced to a term in the custody of the
state board of correction which term shall be for not less than five (5) years and said
term may extend to life." I. C. § 19-2514.
4

5

agreement that resulted in some charges being dismissed. One of the
charges dropped happened to be a persistent violator charge. Since he
had negotiated a dismissal of the first persistent violator charge, Brandt
could hardly argue that he was not aware of the nature of such a charge
or that he had not been warned of the consequences of repetitive criminal
conduct. The purpose of our persistent violator statute is to punish repeat
offenders by making their sentences for successive crimes more harsh.

Id. at 344 (citation omitted).
The general rule set forth in Brandt has since been applied several times by the
Idaho Court of Appeals.

In State v. Harrington, 133 Idaho 563 (Ct. App. 1999), the

Court of Appeals upheld the district court's conclusion that two prior felony convictions
from Arkansas fell within the scope of Brandf s general rule, thus precluding imposition
of a persistent violator enhancement. The court described the facts underlying those
prior convictions as follows:
Harrington was apprehended while attempting to burglarize a local Piggly
Wiggly.
Harrington admitted during his interrogation that he had
burglarized that very same grocery store ten days prior. The State of
Arkansas filed separate indictments on the two charges, but they had
consecutive case numbers. Harrington pied guilty to both charges on
December 9, 1993, in one proceeding before the same judge. Sentences
for both convictions were entered on the same day and were identical.
Harrington, 133 Idaho at 565.

In concluding that the district court correctly applied

Brandfs general rule, the Court of Appeals explained,

Admittedly, the charges have separate case numbers and separate
informations, although filed simultaneously, but we cannot allow the state
of Idaho to circumvent the general rule of Brandt simply because an
Arkansas prosecutor declined to consolidate these cases. Harrington's
convictions were basically separate parts of a common scheme or plan
and obviously could have been charged in one information, thus placing
him squarely within the general rule articulated in Brandt.
Id. at 566.

In two other cases, the facts of which are easily distinguishable from those of
Mr. Barber's case, the Court of Appeals has found that the exception recognized in
6

Brandt applied. In one, the Court of Appeals noted that, although the two convictions

were entered on the same day before the same judge, the "two prior felony convictions
were unrelated crimes, grand theft and felony DUI, committed on different dates in
different counties." State v. Mace, 133 Idaho 903, 907 (Ct. App. 2000). Furthermore,
Mace did

not even

argue that the

general

rule

in

Brandt applied,

having

"acknowledge[d] that because his prior felonies were unrelated crimes charged in
separate informations, they do not qualify for treatment as a single conviction under the
rule enunciated in Brandt."

Id.

Instead, Mace argued for the exception to Brandfs

general rule to be overruled, which the Court of Appeals declined to do.

Id.

In the

second, the Court of Appeals found that the exception to the general rule applied
because the "convictions were for separate crimes perpetrated on separate victims.
They consisted of two burglaries in different counties, and one escape from a jail.
These convictions were for distinguishable incidents of criminal conduct. Consequently,
it was permissible to treat them as evidence of multiple prior felonies." State v. Smith,
116 Idaho 553,560 (Ct. App. 1989).
The only similarity between Mr. Barber's prior convictions and those that the
court used in applying the exception in Brandt is that they were almost certainly charged
in separate charging instruments, which can be inferred from the fact that two separate
judgments were prepared, each containing a different case number.
Nos. 4 and 5.) That, however, is where the similarities end.

(State's Exhibit

In contrast to the facts

presented by the State in Brandt, there is no indication that Mr. Barber's prior
convictions involved separate victims, separate incidents, separate locations, different
dates, or that the cases were resolved via a global plea agreement.

(State's Exhibit

Nos. 4 and 5.) Nor is there any indication that Mr. Barber was warned, at the time of his
7

guilty pleas in those matters, that he would be subject to the strictures of Idaho Code
§ 18-918(3)(c) for having been adjudged guilty of two separate domestic batteries.

(State's Exhibit Nos. 4 and 5.) Additionally, the facts presented by the State are similar
to those in Harrington in which the general rule was applied to bar application of the
persistent violator enhancement. Specifically, Mr. Barber's two convictions were for the
same charge (domestic battery), and resulted in identical, concurrent sentences of one
hundred days in jail. (State's Exhibit Nos. 4 and 5.)
Perhaps the State could have established facts similar to those in Brandt, Smith,
and Mace in order to invoke the exception had it chosen to present charging
instruments for the two cases, documents regarding a plea agreement, and/or
transcripts from the plea hearings.

Having chosen not to do so, the State failed to

present sufficient evidence that Mr. Barber had two prior domestic battery convictions
that were separate and distinct for purposes of the felony enhancement.
Because the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Mr. Barber's two prior
convictions for domestic battery were separate and distinct convictions necessary to
invoke the exception to the general rule adopted in Brandt, he respectfully requests that
this Court vacate the finding that the current conviction constituted a felony, and remand
this matter for resentencing on his conviction for misdemeanor domestic battery.

8

11.
Mr. Barber Was Deprived Of His Constitutional Right To A Jury Trial When The District
Court Found The Sentencing Enhancement In The Absence Of A Knowing, Intelligent,
And Voluntary Waiver Of His Right To A Jury Trial On The Enhancement

A.

Introduction
Mr. Barber asserts that, if this Court rejects his argument set forth in Part I,

supra, and finds the evidence was sufficient for the district court to find that he was

subject to a felony enhancement, it should remand his case for a jury trial because the
district court deprived him of his constitutional right to a jury trial on the felony
enhancement, under both the Idaho and United States Constitutions, by doing so in the
absence of a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to a jury trial.

8.

Standards Of Review
1.

Fundamental Error

In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court adopted a
fundamental error analysis applicable to most unpreserved claims of constitutional
violations.

For most such claims, the Court will only provide relief if the defendant

satisfies a three-prong test by establishing that the error "( 1) violates one or more of the
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any
additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." Perry,
150 Idaho at 227-28.
Some unpreserved constitutional errors - "structural defects" - are of such
magnitude that they defy the application of the harmless error test set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
9

The

constitutional rights underlying such structural defects "are so basic to a fair trial that the
violation of those rights requires an automatic reversal and is not subject to harmless
error analysis."

Id. at 222 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991 )).

Structural defects are those "which affect 'the framework within which the trial proceeds,
rather than simply an error in the trial process itself' and thus are so inherently unfair
that they are not subject to harmless error analysis." Id. (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S.
at 307-08.)
In Perry, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that the United States Supreme Court
had only found the following errors to

structural: "(1) complete denial of counsel; (2)

biased trial judge; (3) racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury; (4) denial of
self-representation at trial; (5) denial of a public trial; (6) defective reasonable doubt
instruction; and (7) erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel of choice." Id. (internal
citations omitted). The Perry Court noted, "[a]lthough there may be other constitutional
violations that would so affect the core of the trial process that they would require an
automatic reversal, as a general rule, most constitutional violations will be subject to
harmless error analysis." Id. at 222-23 (citation omitted). In Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508
U.S. 275 (1993), the United States Supreme Court, discussing the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial, concluded, "[t]he deprivation of that right, with consequences that are
necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate, unquestionably qualifies as 'structural
error."' Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 281-82.

2.

Waiver Of A Constitutional Right

"[T]he state has a heavy burden in overcoming a presumption against the waiver
of constitutional rights."

State v. Bainbridge, 108 Idaho 273, 276 (1985) (citation

omitted). On appeal, a waiver of a constitutional right "will be upheld if the entire record
10

demonstrates the waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently."

State v.

Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 95 (2004); see a/so State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 498 (1983)
(appellate court looks to the totality of the circumstances when assessing whether trial
court properly found a valid waiver of a constitutional right).

C.

Mr. Barber Was Deprived Of His Constitutional Right To A Jury Trial When The
District Court Found The Sentencing Enhancement In The Absence Of A
Knowing, Intelligent, and Voluntary Waiver Of The Right To A Jury Trial On The
Enhancement
Article I, Section 7 of the Idaho Constitution, in relevant part, provides, "[t]he right

of trial by jury shall remain inviolate ... A trial by jury may be waived in all criminal
cases, by the consent of all parties, expressed in open court .... " lo. CONST. Art. I § 7.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in relevant part, provides, "[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

The Idaho Constitution provides

greater protection of the right to a jury trial in a criminal case than the Sixth Amendment.

See State v. Wheeler, 114 Idaho 97, 100-01 (Ct. App. 1988) (Sixth Amendment
guarantees jury trial only for "serious, non-petty offense[s]," while Article I, Section 7
guarantees jury trial for "all public offenses which are potentially punishable by
imprisonment or where potential fines or other sanctions are punitive in nature")
(citations omitted).

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a persistent violator

enhancement is an issue of fact that must be determined by a jury under Article I, § 7 of
the Idaho Constitution. State v. Dunn, 44 Idaho 636, 640 (1927).
In concluding that a criminal defendant may waive his Sixth Amendment right to
a jury trial, the United States Supreme Court has explained that because the right is so
important it must be "jealously preserved," and, "that, before any waiver can become
11

effective, the consent of government counsel and the sanction of the court must be had,
in addition to the express and intelligent consent of the defendant." Patton v. United
States, 281 U.

276, 312 (1930), abrogated on other grounds by Williams v. Florida,

399 U.S. 78 (1970) (emphasis added). The Court concluded by noting, "[T]he duty of
the trial court in that regard is not to be discharged as a mere matter of rote, but with
sound and advised discretion, with an eye to avoid unreasonable or undue departures
from" the preference for trial by jury, with the court's "caution increasing in degree as the
offenses dealt with increase in gravity." Id. at 312-13.
In State v. Cheatham, 139 Idaho 413 (Ct. App. 2003), the Idaho Court of Appeals
considered, as an issue of first impression in Idaho, what steps a district court must take
in order to find a valid waiver of a defendant's right to a jury trial under Idaho's
persistent violator statute, Idaho Code § 18-918(3)(c). Cheatham, 139 Idaho at 416.
Following a jury trial at which Cheatham was convicted of the underlying crimes, the
district court inquired of defense counsel as to whether Cheatham stipulated "as to Part
II of the Information."

In response, defense counsel stated, "Judge, we'll admit that

those allegations are true." Id. at 414-15. In describing the circumstances underlying
this stipulation, the Court of Appeals noted, "Cheatham was present at the time of this
stipulation, but did not speak to the court. The trial court did not ask Cheatham whether
he voluntarily assented to the stipulation or understood its effect on his potential
sentence." Id. at 415.
The Court of Appeals began its analysis "with the recognition that under Idaho
law, when a persistent violator enhancement is sought, the defendant is entitled to a

jury trial on the State's allegations of previous felony convictions." Id. at 416 (citing
Dunn, 44 Idaho at 640). The Court of Appeals concluded that more than a stipulation

12

was required in order for a defendant's right to a trial on the enhancement to be waived.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals reasoned that "due process principles
preclude the acceptance of a stipulation to the truth of persistent violator allegations
without judicial inquiry to determine that the defendant makes the admission voluntarily
and with an understanding of the consequences."

Id. at 418.

It further explained,

"Under Idaho law, the detriment from being found a persistent violator is dramatic ...
The defendant may be subject to a sentence 'many times as great as that prescribed by
statute for the offense."' Id. (quoting State v. Lovejoy, 60 Idaho 632, 638 (1939)).
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals held that a waiver of trial on a persistent violator
enhancement "will be valid only if the record shows that the defendant entered into the
stipulation voluntarily in the sense that the defendant was not coerced, and knowingly in
the sense that the defendant understands the potential sentencing consequences." Id.
The following portion of the transcript containing the stipulation and its aftermath
illustrates that the requirements set forth in Cheatham were not satisfied. Following the
jury's guilty verdict on the misdemeanor charge of domestic battery, the district court
began the jury trial on the enhancement allegation set forth in Part II by reading that
portion of the Information to the jury, and explaining that it "requires us to reopen the
cases [sic], take evidence on those alleged prior convictions." (Tr., p.381, L.20 - p.382,
L.11.)
As the State sought to call the investigating detective from this case to testify,
Mr. Barber interjected, stating, "I'm not denying that I have two prior convictions."
(Tr., p.382, Ls.13-22.) At that point, standby counsel stated, "It would make it easier,

Your Honor, if we just stipulate that he has the two prior convictions from 201 O."
(Tr., p.382, Ls.23-25.)

The district court then inquired of Mr. Barber as follows:
13

"Mr. Barber, the issue is whether you have two prior convictions within the past 15 years
of this particular code section, domestic battery.

Is that something you're willing to

stipulate to or do you want to require the State to put on evidence?" (Tr., p.383, Ls.1-6.)
In response, Mr. Barber stated, "Yeah, I'll stipulate to that."

(Tr., p.383, Ls.7-8.)

Immediately thereafter, the district court announced, "Based upon that stipulation in
court, then, as a matter of law the Court finds that there are two prior convictions of
domestic battery, which would make this a felony conviction on the alternative charge."
(Tr., p.383, Ls.9-13.)
The district court then asked the State whether it had anything "to take up," to
which the State responded that it sought "for clarity purposes" to admit State's Exhibit
Nos. 4 and 5, the certified copies of the prior judgments of conviction, which were
admitted without objection.

(Tr., p.383, L.14 - p.384, L.3.)

The district court then

discharged the jury, explaining, "That resolves that particular factual issue ... so that
does resolve the case." (Tr., p.384, Ls.4-6.) At no time did the district court inform
Mr. Barber what the consequences of a finding on the enhancement were, or ask
whether, by his stipulation, he intended to waive his constitutional right to a jury finding
on the enhancement.
With respect to the first prong of the Perry test, the error violated one of
Mr. Barber's unwaived constitutional rights. With respect to the second, the error was,
in light of the Court of Appeals' holding in Cheatham, plain on the record. With respect
to the third prong, Mr. Barber notes that, in light of the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Sullivan that a deprivation of the right to a jury trial is structural error, he need
not establish that the error was not harmless in order to prevail on appeal. Assuming
that this Court finds that Mr. Barber must establish that the error was not harmless, he
14

hereby incorporates the argument set forth in Part I of this brief to demonstrate that the
error was not harmless.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Barber respectfully requests that this Court
vacate the judgment of conviction for felony domestic battery, and remand this matter
for sentencing on the conviction for misdemeanor domestic battery. In the alternative, if
this Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the district court's finding as to the
enhancement, or declines to reach that issue, he respectfully requests that this Court
vacate the enhancement finding, and remand this matter for a jury trial on the
enhancement.
DATED this 2ih day of February, 2013.

SPENCERJ.HAHN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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